On-Site inspecting Zombie Lending

被引:18
|
作者
Bonfim, Diana [1 ,2 ]
Cerqueiro, Geraldo [2 ]
Degryse, Hans [3 ,4 ]
Ongena, Steven [3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ]
机构
[1] Financial Intermediat Div, Econ & Res Dept, P-1100150 Lisbon, Portugal
[2] Catolica Lisbon Sch Business & Econ, Sci Area Finance & Accounting, P-1649023 Lisbon, Portugal
[3] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Dept Accountancy Finance & Insurance, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
[4] Ctr Econ Policy Res, Programme Area Financial Econ, London EC1V 0DX, England
[5] Univ Zurich, Dept Banking & Finance, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
[6] Swiss Finance Inst, Campus Zurich, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[7] Norges Tekn Nat Vitenskapelige Univ, Ctr Banking & Finance, Business Sch, N-7491 Trondheim, Norway
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
zombie lending; on-site inspection; banking supervision; CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS; BANKING;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2022.4452
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
"Zombie lending" remains a widespread practice by banks around the world. In this paper, we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections affect banks' future lending decisions. We find that an inspected bank becomes 20% less likely to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. Overall, banks seemingly reduce zombie lending because the incentives to hold these loans disappear once they are forced to recognize losses.
引用
收藏
页码:2547 / 2567
页数:22
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