Structure of Local Political Power and Family Firms' Concentration of Wealth

被引：3
|
作者：
He, Xuan [1 ]
Zhang, Yingyu [1 ,2 ]
Xiao, Weicheng [1 ]
机构：
[1] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Sch Econ & Trade, Guangzhou 510006, Peoples R China
来源：
FAMILY BUSINESS REVIEW | 2023年 / 36卷 / 02期
关键词：
de jure political power; de facto political power; tenure of officials; family firm; wealth concentration; MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INCOME INEQUALITY; PERFORMANCE; CHINA; OWNERSHIP; NETWORKS; TURNOVER; TOP;
D O I：
10.1177/08944865221140647
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Wealth concentration is a common problem worldwide, and research reveals that wealth is most concentrated in family firm holdings. We examined the influence of local political structure on the concentration of family firm wealth and found that (a) changes in de jure political power (provincial party secretary turnover) temporarily inhibit family firm wealth concentration, (b) local de facto power offers strong countervailing protection against this effect, and (c) there is a U-shaped relationship between the tenure of the provincial party secretary and wealth concentration. This investigation deepens our understanding of the relationship between family firm political connections and wealth concentration.
引用
收藏
页码：199 / 222
页数：24
相关论文
共 50 条
12345