Directors appointment of non-largest shareholders and related-party transactions

被引：2
|
作者：
Qi, Songqiao [1 ]
Sun, Tianmin [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Penn, Socail Policy & Practice, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Sci, Hong Kong 999077, Peoples R China
来源：
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2023年 / 58卷
关键词：
Related-party transactions; Non-first shareholder; Appointed director;
D O I：
10.1016/j.frl.2023.104612
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper selects state-owned enterprises listed from 2010 to 2020 as the research object and analyzes the impact of non-largest shareholders appointing non-independent directors on the previous significant shareholders' related-party transactions behaviors prevalent in state-owned enterprises. It is found that in the realization mechanism of mixed reform, the appointment of non-independent directors by non-largest shareholders can significantly reduce the number of related-party transactions of listed companies; compared with the state-owned non-largest shareholders, the appointment of non-independent directors by non-state-owned first major shareholders has a significant inhibiting effect on the related-party transactions behavior of listed companies.
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