Moral disagreement and artificial intelligence

被引:2
|
作者
Robinson, Pamela [1 ]
机构
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Sch Philosophy, Level 6, 146 Ellery Crescent ANU, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
关键词
moral disagreement; moral decision-making; value alignment; UNCERTAINTY; CONFLICT;
D O I
10.1007/s00146-023-01697-y
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without universal agreement about the relevant moral facts. For other kinds of disagreement, it is at least usually obvious what kind of solution is called for. What makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are three different ways of handling it. Moral solutions apply a moral theory or related principles and largely ignore the details of the disagreement. Compromise solutions apply a method of finding a compromise and taking information about the disagreement as input. Epistemic solutions apply an evidential rule that treats the details of the disagreement as evidence of moral truth. Proposals for all three kinds of solutions can be found in the AI ethics and value alignment literature, but little has been said to justify choosing one over the other. I argue that the choice is best framed in terms of moral risk.
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页码:2425 / 2438
页数:14
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