Sequential mergers under incomplete information

被引：1
|
作者：
Cong, Jiajia [1 ]
Zhou, Wen [2 ]
机构：
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Dept Appl Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Business Sch, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2024年 / 33卷 / 01期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
EARLY-MOVER ADVANTAGES; HORIZONTAL MERGERS; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; WAVES; TAKEOVER; DISADVANTAGES; PERFORMANCE; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1111/jems.12549
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study sequential mergers under incomplete information where the follower is ignorant about the leader's merger synergy. When the follower's own synergy is sufficiently large, incomplete information induces both firms to merge more. These additional mergers benefit both firms and total welfare but hurt consumers. If the follower's synergy is very small, the leader is unable to take any strategic action, and most results are reversed. The analysis suggests that incomplete information strengthens the strategic complementarity between the two mergers and thereby increases the likelihood of a merger wave.
引用
收藏
页码：131 / 154
页数：24
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