Do related party transactions promote or depress a firm's investment in organization capital?

被引：0
|
作者：
Shin, Ilhang [1 ]
Lee, Hansol [2 ]
机构：
[1] Gachon Univ, Coll Business, Seongnam Si, South Korea
[2] Yonsei Univ, Sch Business, Seoul, South Korea
来源：
APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 55卷 / 31期
关键词：
Related party transactions; organization capital; investment; intangible assets; intangible capital; IMPACT; PRODUCTIVITY; MANAGEMENT; COMPANIES; DYNAMICS;
D O I：
10.1080/00036846.2023.2174933
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine whether related party transactions influence a firm's investment in organization capital, using a sample of Korean firms from 2001 to 2020. Given that the high magnitude of related party transactions increases a firm's dependence on the captive market within related parties, we hypothesize that a firm's incentives to invest in intangible capital are low when there are heavy related party transactions. We find the negative relationship between related party transactions and a firm's investment in organization capital, consistent with the notion that related party transactions significantly impact the firm's operations. We also find that such a relationship is more pronounced for firms in the high-tech industry and those that are financially weak.
引用
收藏
页码：3661 / 3674
页数：14
相关论文
共 50 条
12345