Neurotechnologies, Ethics, and the Limits of Free Will

被引:2
|
作者
Adomaitis, Laurynas [1 ]
Grinbaum, Alexei [1 ]
机构
[1] CEA Saclay Larsim, LARSIM, F-91191 Gif sur Yvette, France
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
Neurotechnologies; Machine learning; Free will; Responsibility; Autonomy; BRAIN; AMYGDALA; FEAR;
D O I
10.1007/s12124-024-09830-2
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This article delves into the implications of neurotechnologies for the philosophical debates surrounding free will and moral responsibility. Tracing the concept from ancient religious and philosophical roots, we discuss how recent neurotechnological advancements (e.g. optogenetics, fMRI and machine learning, predictive diagnostics, et al.) challenge traditional notions of autonomy. Although neurotechnologies aim to enhance autonomy in the strict sense - as self-determination - they risk reducing or changing the broader notion of autonomy, which involves personal authenticity. We also submit that, in a world with an altered or limited concept of free will, humans should still be held accountable for actions executed through their bodies. By examining the dynamic between choice and responsibility, we emphasize the shift in technology ethics, moral philosophy, and the broader legal landscape in response to the advancement of neurotechnologies. By bringing the neurotechnological innovations into the world, neuroscientists not only change the technological landscape but also partake in long-standing moral narratives about freedom, justice, and responsibility.
引用
收藏
页码:894 / 907
页数:14
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