Hybrid governance of platform entrepreneurs

Platform organizations have assumed an important role in the governance of millions of entrepreneurs. Powerful platforms play an internal gatekeeping role in governing the platform-dependent entrepreneurs, but the success of platform governance also depends on how those entrepreneurs respond to external governance regimes (e.g., governments and public agencies). We conducted a vignette experiment involving 3000 e-commerce sellers to evaluate the effectiveness of hybrid governance (platform rules reminding entrepreneurs of the law and public enforcement) versus platform-led governance (platform rules without such reminders). The experiment varies on the governance structure (hybrid versus platform-led) and the level of ambiguity in a platform rule. It finds that, relative to platform-led governance, hybrid governance reduced entrepreneurs' misconduct intentions by 26 %. The effect is especially strong when rules are more ambiguous. Mechanism tests show that a fear of government intervention likely led entrepreneurs to comply with hybrid governance out of expedience as ambiguity in-creases. Meanwhile, some entrepreneurs still exhibited greater misconduct intentions because they may have perceived the platform to be opportunistic and willing to condone misconduct. Overall, this study demonstrates the nested nature of platform governance and the multiplex influences of different governance regimes on entrepreneurs.