Illusionism is a physicalist theory of consciousness, according to which phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion that appears as a result of the functioning of introspective mechanisms that represent non-phenomenal properties as phenomenal ones. In contrast to classical qualia, which are subjective, ineffable, and our perception of them is direct and unmistakable, illusionism offers "zero qualia" - properties of experience, by virtue of which we are disposed to claim that we possess classical qualia, without actually possessing them. Zero qualia are quasi-phenomenal properties. Perceptual illusions are usually given as examples. For instance, even knowing the mechanism of the focus with the "sawing" of a person, I will still be subject to an illusion - it will seem to me that I see two halves of a person not connected to each other. Illusionists believe that if I can be wrong in such cases, then I can be wrong in the case of qualia: there is something that seems to me - my experience has phenomenal properties, and that is real - the absence of qualia. Cost-effectiveness is one of the main advantages of the illusionist approach to qualia. Although it is equally important that, firstly, illusionism allows us to expand and improve our argumentation about qualia, having illusionist arguments against them before us; and, secondly, it emphasizes the difference between qualia and is available for study from a third-person perspective. The latter may suggest the idea of both illusion and specific reality of qualia. However, problems with the illusionist approach are more significant. One can note the strategy of counterargument against the possibility of zombies, which boils down to the assumption of their impossibility and does not offer a strong argumentative alternative. It is also impossible to justify one's own position, since, if qualia are illusory, everything can be an illusion, including the content of the illusionist approach. In addition, the conceptualization that illusionists often point to as the reason for the belief about qualia does not actually cover current qualia, but is aimed at past ones. Therefore, the statement about the possibility of an error about qualia loses its force, and, therefore, so does the statement about the lack of special access to them.
