Direct reciprocity among humans

被引:4
|
作者
Rossetti, Charlotte S. L. [1 ,2 ]
Hilbe, Christian [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, Plon, Germany
[2] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Max Planck Res Grp Dynam Social Behav, D-24306 Plon, Germany
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
direct reciprocity; evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game theory; human behavior; reciprocal altruism; REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; RATIONAL COOPERATION; PROMOTE COOPERATION; NETWORK STRUCTURE; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; REPEATED GAMES; REPEATED PLAY; STRATEGY; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1111/eth.13407
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Direct reciprocity is the tendency to repay others' cooperation. This tendency can be crucial to maintain cooperation in evolving populations. Once direct reciprocity evolves, individuals have a long-run interest to cooperate, even if it is costly in the short run. The major theoretical framework to describe reciprocal behavior is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Over the past decades, this game has been the major workhorse to predict when reciprocal cooperation ought to evolve, and which strategies individuals are supposed to adopt. Herein, we compare these predictions with the empirical evidence from experiments with human subjects. From a theory-driven perspective, humans represent an ideal test case, because they give researchers the most flexibility to tailor the experimental design to the assumptions of a model. Overall, we find that theoretical models describe well in which situations people cooperate. However, in the important case of "indefinitely repeated games," they have difficulties to predict which strategies people use. The prisoner's dilemma.image
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页数:13
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