environmental corporate social responsibility;
green managerial delegation;
network externalities;
price competition;
DELEGATION;
PRICE;
COMPETITION;
D O I:
10.1515/bejte-2022-0136
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper adopts a green managerial delegation model in a polluting network industry wherein consumers form fulfilled rational expectations of network externalities. We show that firms are consistently incentivized to undertake ECSR (environmental corporate social responsibility) under price competition, while positive network externalities can increase the strategic level of ECSR. We also show that product substitutability between network products can play an important role in determining a firm's strategic level of ECSR and resulting profits. Finally, ECSR is conducive to increasing environmental quality and social welfare in a high-polluting network industry. Therefore, the strategic adoption of ECSR in a network industry is Pareto-improving as environmental damage becomes serious.
机构:
Willamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USAWillamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USA
Maltz, Elliot
Thompson, Fred
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机构:
Willamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USAWillamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USA
Thompson, Fred
Ringold, Debra Jones
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h-index: 0
机构:
Willamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USAWillamette Univ, Atkinson Grad Sch Management, 900 State St, Salem, OR 97302 USA
机构:
World Bank, Private Sect Dev Vice Presidency, 2121 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20433 USAWorld Bank, Private Sect Dev Vice Presidency, 2121 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA