Critical Relaxed Stable Matchings with Two-Sided Ties

被引:0
|
作者
Nasre, Meghana [1 ]
Nimbhorkar, Prajakta [2 ,3 ]
Ranjan, Keshav [1 ]
机构
[1] IIT Madras, Chennai, India
[2] Chennai Math Inst, Chennai, India
[3] UMI ReLaX, Chennai, India
关键词
Stable Matching; Ties in Preferences; Critical; Relaxed Stable; Approximation Algorithm; STABILITY; VARIANTS; MARRIAGE;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-031-43380-1_32
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We consider the stable marriage problem in the presence of ties in preferences and critical vertices. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A. B, E) where A and B denote sets of vertices which need to be matched. Each vertex has a preference ordering over its neighbours possibly containing ties. In addition, a subset of vertices in A. B are marked as critical and the goal is to output a matching that matches as many critical vertices as possible. Such matchings are called critical matchings in the literature and in our setting, we seek to compute a matching that is critical as well as optimal with respect to the preferences of the vertices. Stability, which is a well-accepted notion of optimality in the presence of two-sided preferences, is generalized to weak-stability in the presence of ties. It is well known that in the presence of critical vertices, a matching that is critical as well as weakly stable may not exist. Popularity is another well-investigated notion of optimality for the two-sided preference list setting, however, in the presence of ties (even with no critical vertices), a popular matching need not exist. We, therefore, consider the notion of relaxed stability which was introduced and studied by Krishnaa et. al. (SAGT 2020). We show that in our setting a critical matching which is relaxed stable always exists although computing a maximum-sized relaxed stable matching turns out to be NP-hard. Our main contribution is a 3 2 -approximation to the maximum-sized critical relaxed stable matching for the stable marriage problem where ties as well as critical vertices are present on both the sides of the bipartition.
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 461
页数:15
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