Two-Sided Fairness for Repeated Matchings in Two-Sided Markets: A Case Study of a Ride-Hailing Platform

被引:61
|
作者
Suehr, Tom [1 ]
Biega, Asia J. [2 ,3 ]
Zehlike, Meike [1 ]
Gummadi, Krishna P. [1 ]
Chakraborty, Abhijnan [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Software Syst, Saarbrucken, Germany
[2] Microsoft Res Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[3] MPI INF, Saarbrucken, Germany
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1145/3292500.3330793
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Ride hailing platforms, such as Uber, Lyft, Ola or DiDi, have traditionally focused on the satisfaction of the passengers, or on boosting successful business transactions. However, recent studies provide a multitude of reasons to worry about the drivers in the ride hailing ecosystem. The concerns range from bad working conditions and worker manipulation to discrimination against minorities. With the sharing economy ecosystem growing, more and more drivers financially depend on online platforms and their algorithms to secure a living. It is pertinent to ask what a fair distribution of income on such platforms is and what power and means the platform has in shaping these distributions. In this paper, we analyze job assignments of a major taxi company and observe that there is significant inequality in the driver income distribution. We propose a novel framework to think about fairness in the matching mechanisms of ride hailing platforms. Specifically, our notion of fairness relies on the idea that, spread over time, all drivers should receive benefits proportional to the amount of time they are active in the platform. We postulate that by not requiring every match to be fair, but rather distributing fairness over time, we can achieve better overall benefit for the drivers and the passengers. We experiment with various optimization problems and heuristics to explore the means of achieving two-sided fairness, and investigate their caveats and side-effects. Overall, our work takes the first step towards rethinking fairness in ride hailing platforms with an additional emphasis on the well-being of drivers.
引用
收藏
页码:3082 / 3092
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets
    Zhou, Quan
    Marecek, Jakub
    Shorten, Robert
    Kumar, Ashwani
    [J]. PLOS ONE, 2023, 18 (02):
  • [2] Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
    Chen, Peter
    Egesdal, Michael
    Pycia, Marek
    Yenmez, M. Bumin
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2016, 97 : 64 - 69
  • [3] The Power of Two-Sided Recruitment in Two-Sided Markets
    Cai, Yang
    Liaw, Christopher
    Mehta, Aranyak
    Zhao, Mingfei
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING, STOC 2024, 2024, : 201 - 212
  • [4] PLATFORM COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS
    Rochet, Jean-Charles
    Tirole, Jean
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2003, 1 (04)
  • [5] Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
    Rochet, Jean-Charles
    Tirole, Jean
    [J]. COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL, 2014, 10 (02): : 181 - 218
  • [6] Two-sided coalitional matchings
    Dimitrov, Dinko
    Lazarova, Emiliya
    [J]. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2011, 62 (01) : 46 - 54
  • [7] Two-Sided Markets
    King, Stephen P.
    [J]. AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2013, 46 (02) : 247 - 258
  • [8] FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms
    Patro, Gourab K.
    Biswas, Arpita
    Ganguly, Niloy
    Gummadi, Krishna P.
    Chakraborty, Abhijnan
    [J]. WEB CONFERENCE 2020: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE (WWW 2020), 2020, : 1194 - 1204
  • [9] Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
    Polanski, Arnold
    Winter, Eyal
    [J]. B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 10 (01):
  • [10] Surge Pricing and Two-Sided Temporal Responses in Ride Hailing
    Hu, Bin
    Hu, Ming
    Zhu, Han
    [J]. M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2022, 24 (01) : 91 - 109