ESG Mutual Fund Voting on Executive Compensation Shareholder Proposals

被引:4
|
作者
Dikolli, Shane S. [1 ]
Frank, Mary Margaret [1 ]
Guo, Zhe [2 ]
Lynch, Luann J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Virginia, Darden Sch Business, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[2] Fordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY USA
关键词
ESG; CSR; mutual funds; sustainability; shareholder proposals; proxy voting; executive compensation; SAY-ON-PAY;
D O I
10.2308/JMAR-2022-036
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate how mutual funds with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives vote on shareholder proposals related to executive compensation. Using a sample of 94,695 votes by 2,354 mutual funds from 2012 to 2021, we find ESG funds are 9.4 percent more likely than non-ESG funds to vote in favor of such proposals, and the likelihood increases to 19.2 percent for proposals aligning executive compensation with environmental and social (ES) objectives. ESG funds are also 14.9 percent more likely to support proposals to improve transparency, but only 7.0 percent more likely to support proposals about redesigning compensation. Our results are consistent with ESG funds perceiving greater net benefits from supporting shareholder compensation proposals, particularly those related to ES objectives and transparency. Additionally, funds committed to ESG objectives in regulatory filings are more likely to support such proposals than fund families that voluntarily signed the United Nations' Principles of Responsible Investment.
引用
收藏
页码:51 / 74
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Walk the talk: ESG mutual fund voting on shareholder proposals
    Shane S. Dikolli
    Mary Margaret Frank
    Zhe Michael Guo
    Luann J. Lynch
    [J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2022, 27 : 864 - 896
  • [2] Walk the talk: ESG mutual fund voting on shareholder proposals
    Dikolli, Shane S.
    Frank, Mary Margaret
    Guo, Zhe Michael
    Lynch, Luann J.
    [J]. REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES, 2022, 27 (03) : 864 - 896
  • [3] Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
    Ashraf, Rasha
    Jayaraman, Narayanan
    Ryan, Harley E., Jr.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2012, 47 (03) : 567 - 588
  • [4] The effect of shareholder proposals on executive compensation
    Thomas, RS
    Martin, KJ
    [J]. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW, 1999, 67 (04) : 1021 - 1081
  • [5] The evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes
    Morgan, Angela
    Poulsen, Annette
    Wolf, Jack
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2006, 12 (04) : 715 - 737
  • [7] Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals
    Levit, Doron
    Malenko, Nadya
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2011, 66 (05): : 1579 - 1614
  • [8] Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation
    Butler, Alexander W.
    Gurun, Umit G.
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2012, 25 (08): : 2533 - 2562
  • [9] Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule
    Cremers, K. J. Martijn
    Romano, Roberta
    [J]. AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW, 2011, 13 (01) : 220 - 268
  • [10] Firm performance and mutual fund voting
    Ng, Lilian
    Wang, Qinghai
    Zaiats, Nataliya
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2009, 33 (12) : 2207 - 2217