Anne Conway on memory

Anne Conway's understanding of the faculty of memory in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy crucially intersects with her larger psychological and metaphysical projects. However, it has thus far been largely overlooked in the secondary literature. It is the purpose of this article to rectify this omission and emphasize the greater role which this faculty has to play in Conway's philosophy by systematically examining her account of memory. I do this by first elucidating the objects of memory as well as the key features of the faculty itself before turning to develop what I believe to be a hitherto unnoticed but significant concern, which arises out of one of the key conditions required for memory to occur and which seriously threatens to undermine Conway's theological and soteriological positions. After considering and rejecting several possibilities for alleviating this worry, I posit an interpretation which I argue is capable of resolving the concern, restoring coherence to Conway's theological and soteriological projects, and more fully revealing Conway's understanding of the faculty of memory itself.