A protocol for repeated bargaining

被引：1
|
作者：
Kato, Akihisa [1 ]
Rull, Jose Victor Rios [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构：
[1] Osaka Univ, Osaka, Japan
[2] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA USA
[3] CAERP, Philadelphia, PA USA
[4] CEPR, Washington, DC USA
[5] NBER, Cambridge, MA USA
[6] UCL, Carrollton, TX USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2023年 / 227卷
关键词：
Repeated bargaining; Limited commitment; Markov perfect equilibria;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We propose a protocol for repeated bargaining where occasional periods of good outside opportunities yield improved outcomes but also higher breakout probabilities, yet there is a lot of risk sharing. Crucially, we only consider Markov perfect equilibria that have neither non payoff-relevant state variables that are costly to compute nor a contrived process of equilibrium selection. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：4
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