Consistent queueing rules

被引：1
|
作者：
Thomson, William [1 ]
Velez, Rodrigo A. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Rochester, River Campus, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
来源：
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING | 2024年 / 203卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
Consistency; Converse consistency; Queueing problems; No-envy; NO-ENVY; ALLOCATION; ECONOMIES; CORE;
D O I：
10.1007/s10107-022-01905-5
中图分类号：
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号：
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
In a "queueing problem ", a group of agents are waiting for a service. Each agent incurs a cost of waiting that is proportional to the time they wait. Monetary transfers can take place. We study the subsolutions of the no-envy solution that are anonymous, consistent, conversely consistent, and continuous. We show that there are infinitely many proper consistent subsolutions from the no-envy solution and characterize a class of these solutions on the basis of basic requirements of continuity, anonymity, monotonicity with respect to the budget available, consistency, and the converse of consistency.
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页码：857 / 869
页数：13
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