Channel leadership and performance for a closed-loop supply chain

This paper investigates channel leadership and performance in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) that involves the competition among an electric vehicle manufacturer (EVM), an electric vehicle recycler (EVR), and a third-party recycler (3PR). We develop a game-theoretic model to obtain the CLSC's equilibrium outcomes for the EVM-led and EVR-led recycling channels and examine the impact of competition on these results. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes and discover that the EVM, EVR, and 3PR have difficulty aligning their preferences for recycling leadership mode, necessitating technological advancements in remanufacturing and governmental intervention. Our research highlights the significance of environmental responsibility awareness in the recycling process and discusses environmental damage and social welfare. Our findings indicate that in situations where the total recycling rate of the CLSC is low, the EVR may offer a higher price to prevent excessive new battery flow into the market. We suggest that the government should encourage more local EVRs to participate in the recycling system to reduce pollution. Finally, we extend our analysis to the cost-savings in remanufacturing and heterogeneous buyback prices.