Managerial ability and financial statement disaggregation decisions

被引:2
|
作者
Bui, Dien Giau [1 ]
Chen, Yehning [2 ]
Chen, Yan-Shing [2 ]
Lin, Chih-Yung [3 ]
机构
[1] Yuan Ze Univ, Coll Management, Taoyuan City, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Finance, Taipei, Taiwan
[3] Natl Yang Ming Chiao Tung Univ, Dept Informat Management & Finance, Hsinchu, Taiwan
关键词
Disaggregation; Financial statements; Managerial ability; Credibility; ANNUAL-REPORT READABILITY; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; EARNINGS; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; COST; PROPRIETARY; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; LIQUIDITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101427
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Firms with high-ability management teams disclose more disaggregated information in financial statements than other firms after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Investors deem the disaggregated information disclosed by high-ability managers to be more credible. More disaggregated accounting information reduces stock price crash risk and lowers the cost of equity to a greater extent when provided by high-ability managers. Superior managers' performance pay is positively related to the level of financial statement disaggregation. These results show that highability managers and their firms benefit more from providing granular accounting information.
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页数:21
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