Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games

被引：1
|
作者：
Pahl, Lucas [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bonn, Inst Microecon, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2023年 / 141卷
关键词：
Game theory; Index theory; Structure of equilibria; Algebraic topology; Refinements of Nash equilibria; EFFICIENT COMPUTATION; EQUILIBRIA;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop index and degree theories for extensive form games allowing the identification of equilibria that are robust to payoff perturbations directly from the extensive form. Our approach is based on index and degree theories for games where the strategy sets are polytopes (and not necessarily simplices) and payoff functions are multiaffine. Polytope strategy sets arise naturally from topologically identifying equivalent mixed strategies of a normal form game.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：444 / 471
页数：28
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Sequence-Form Algorithm for Computing Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
    Bosansky, Branislav
    Cermak, Jiri
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2015, : 805 - 811
  • [32] Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
    Cerny, Jakub
    Bosansky, Branislav
    Kiekintveld, Christopher
    ACM EC'18: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, 2018, : 151 - 168
  • [33] Near-Optimal Φ-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games
    Anagnostides, Ioannis
    Farina, Gabriele
    Sandholm, Tuomas
    INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING, VOL 202, 2023, 202 : 814 - 839
  • [34] Faster Optimistic Online Mirror Descent for Extensive-Form Games
    Jiang, Huacong
    Liu, Weiming
    Li, Bin
    PRICAI 2022: TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PT I, 2022, 13629 : 90 - 103
  • [35] Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
    Xu, Zibo
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2016, 162 : 21 - 54
  • [36] Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment
    Farina, Gabriele
    Marchesi, Alberto
    Kroer, Christian
    Gatti, Nicola
    Sandholm, Tuomas
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2018, : 233 - 239
  • [37] Logit Learning by Valuation in Extensive-Form Games with Simultaneous Moves
    Castiglione, Jason
    Arslan, Gurdal
    2023 62ND IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL, CDC, 2023, : 1213 - 1218
  • [38] The Category of Node-and-Choice Preforms for Extensive-Form Games
    Streufert, Peter A.
    STUDIA LOGICA, 2018, 106 (05) : 1001 - 1064
  • [39] The Category of Node-and-Choice Preforms for Extensive-Form Games
    Peter A. Streufert
    Studia Logica, 2018, 106 : 1001 - 1064
  • [40] Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games
    Stahl, Dale O.
    Haruvy, Ernan
    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 12 (02) : 242 - 251
12345