ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT-TERM GAME AND LONG-TERM EVOLUTIONARY GAME BEHAVIORS OF THE WASTE BATTERY REMANUFACTURING MARKET CONSIDERING GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

The popularity of new energy vehicles is undoubtedly the best response to the current global call to protect the environment, and the subsequent waste battery recycling and remanufacturing industry is quietly emerging under government promotion. This paper considers the government provides production subsidy or consumption subsidy for a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a remanufacturer. The main theme of this research is to explore the impacts of these two types of subsidy on the short-term game and long-term evolutionary game behaviors of the manufacturer and the remanufacturer. To be specific, a Cournot model is built to exam short-term game behaviors in case of production subsidy and consumption subsidy, respectively. Furthermore, we investigate a nonlinear dynamic system to study the long-term evolutionary trend of the supply chain, including long-term operation strategies, the stability of the equilibrium, and how different subsidies impact the system. Results suggest that: (a) the production subsidy is better for higher output of remanufactured products when the eco-design cost of new products is relatively low. And this subsidy works better when consumers are more environmentally conscious. (b) The government is more likely to choose consumption subsidy when consumers have less acceptance of remanufactured products. (c) In the long-term market, the consumption subsidy is more beneficial for the market to remain stable. Nevertheless, excessive adjustments in output by the manufacturer and the remanufacturer can still lead the market to be uncontrolled.