Fahr al-Din al-Razi on Animal Cognition and Immortality

被引:1
|
作者
Adamson, Peter [1 ]
Somma, Bethany [2 ]
机构
[1] LMU Munchen, Fak Philosophie Wissensch Theorie & Relig Wissens, D-80539 Munich, Germany
[2] Fordham Univ, Philosophy Dept, Bronx, NY 10458 USA
来源
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE | 2024年 / 106卷 / 01期
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”; 欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
SOUL;
D O I
10.1515/agph-2021-0171
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Fahr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in his Mulahhas fi l-mantiq wa-l-hikma (Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Fahr al-Din suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and problem-solving. We contextualize these arguments with reference to Fahr al-Din's other philosophical works, and also compare the considerations he raises to ideas found in modern-day animal ethics, drawing here especially on the work of Mark Rowlands. The paper concludes with a translation of the passage.
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页码:23 / 52
页数:30
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