Moral Hazard versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy

被引：4

作者：

Indarte, Sasha ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Finance, Steinberg Dietrich Hall,3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2023年 / 78卷 / 05期

关键词：

REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN; CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY; NEGATIVE EQUITY; MORTGAGE MODIFICATION; DEBT RELIEF; DEFAULT; CREDIT; MARKET; INFORMATION; RISK;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.13263

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the role of moral hazard and liquidity in driving household bankruptcy. First, I estimate that increases in potential debt forgiveness have a positive, but small, effect on filing using a regression kink design. Second, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in mortgage payment reductions, I estimate that filing is five times more responsive to cash-on-hand than relief generosity. Using a sufficient statistic, I show the estimates imply large consumption-smoothing benefits of bankruptcy for the marginal filer. Finally, I conclude that 83% of the filing response to dischargeable debt comes from liquidity effects rather than a moral hazard response to financial incentives.

引用

页码：2421 / 2464

页数：44

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