Fiscal and political determinants of local government maintenance

被引:2
|
作者
Borge, Lars-Erik [1 ,2 ]
Hopland, Arnt O. O. [3 ]
机构
[1] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol NTNU, Dept Econ, Trondheim, Norway
[2] NTNU Social Res, Trondheim, Norway
[3] Norwegian Sch Econ NHH, Dept Business & Management Sci, Bergen, Norway
来源
BUILDING RESEARCH AND INFORMATION | 2023年 / 51卷 / 08期
关键词
Maintenance spending; fiscal capacity; political fragmentation; myopic behaviour; PUBLIC-SECTOR; BEHAVIOR; RULES;
D O I
10.1080/09613218.2023.2206089
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Taking advantage of a novel data set on maintenance in Norwegian local governments, a comparison was made between norms for good maintenance and actual maintenance spending. Although a sizeable minority complies with the norm, the average maintenance spending is well below the norm. A theoretical model is developed to guide the empirical analysis of the determinants of maintenance. It emphasizes the roles of fiscal capacity, fiscal distress, and political fragmentation. The empirical analysis reveals that high fiscal capacity (measured by local government revenue) and little fiscal distress (measured by rainy-day funds) are associated with a high priority of maintenance spending. However, political fragmentation that reflects myopic behaviour is associated with low maintenance priorities. The results are robust and become stronger when outliers and small local governments are omitted.
引用
收藏
页码:937 / 948
页数:12
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