Rethinking Gore-War: Counterfactuals and the 2003 Iraq War

This paper offers a constructivist critique of Frank Harvey's 'Gore-War' counterfactual, in which he argues that the hypothetical President Al Gore also would have gone to war with Iraq. Harvey overlooks how the George W. Bush administration shaped the structural context in which it acted in ways that made war increasingly likely. I trace two key phases in the road to war in which this dynamic occurred: 1. The half-year after 9/11 in which Bush established Iraq as the centerpiece of his response to terrorism. 2. The period from fall 2002 to early 2003 in which Bush pursued the strategy of 'coercive diplomacy' in a manner that all but predetermined the failure of inspections. Using historical evidence about the views of Gore, his likely advisors, and the Democratic policy establishment, I argue for the plausibility of the 'Gore-Peace' counterfactual in which President Gore shaped the context of decision-making on Iraq differently than Bush, prioritized Iraq less, and thereby avoided generating pressure or momentum for war. I conclude with reflections on this argument's implications for counterfactual methodology, historiography, and policy.