政府引导基金、创业投资与企业创新——基于演化博弈视角

被引:16
|
作者
周育红
王鹏宇
梁小敏
机构
[1] 华南理工大学经济与金融学院
关键词
政府引导基金; 创业投资; 企业创新; 演化博弈; 双重委托代理问题;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F832.51 []; F279.2 [中国]; F273.1 [企业技术管理]; F224.32 [博弈论];
学科分类号
摘要
本文通过构建初创企业、创投机构和政府的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab数值仿真模拟,研究政府引导基金如何通过设定不同运作模式利用市场化运作达到政策性目标。结果发现,政府引导基金可以通过实施不同程度的让利激励或监管惩罚,影响创投机构投资策略和初创企业创新策略选择,使初创企业、创投机构和政府三方达到理想的演化均衡。在当前政府引导基金实施的让利机制中增加监管惩罚能更有效解决政府引导基金特殊的双重委托代理问题,使引导资金真正流向初创企业、促进创新。本文建议,政府引导基金应该有选择地进入创投领域;通过加强知识产权保护以提高创新预期收益、利用区块链技术建立政府引导基金私链以降低监管成本、提高惩罚力度以威慑创投机构违约等都可以打破劣后均衡转向理想均衡。
引用
收藏
页码:41 / 53
页数:13
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