Vice, Skill, and the Non-Ideal

A central aim of non-epistemology is to eschew idealisations that tend to distort our epistemological theorising. In this paper, I use the resources of non-ideal epistemology to shed light on a perceived asymmetry between the structure of epistemic virtues and vices. On the one hand, epistemic virtues are widely held to exhibit a skill-component as part of their formal structure. On the other hand, epistemic vices are taken to lack this component. I cast doubt on this asymmetry by demonstrating that it is sustained by two idealisations virtue epistemologists have tended to employ in their theorising of epistemic vice and the environments in which agents develop epistemic virtues. In doing so, I argue that this asymmetry has problematically obscured from view what I call 'vice-indexed skills' - distinctive skills associated with epistemic vices. The existence of these skills not only reveals an important structural symmetry between the epistemic virtues and vices, but it is something that comes to light by applying the tools of non-ideal epistemology to vice epistemology.