Revisiting Stock Option Exercise and CEO Overconfidence

被引:0
|
作者
Mace, Chris [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Naveen Jindal Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75080 USA
关键词
CEO overconfidence; firm profitability; managerial bias; private information; stock option exercise; INFORMATION; OPTIMISM;
D O I
10.1080/15427560.2024.2415327
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A growing body of literature argues that CEOs are irrationally overconfident. I find that the most commonly used measure of overconfidence, holding deep-in-the-money options, may be less of a behavioral bias than previously thought. CEOs who hold deep-in-the-money options make a substantial profit, consistently earning returns above the S&P 500 with significant Fama-French five-factor alphas. Previous literature has also shown that holding deep-in-the-money options is correlated with greater innovation. I find that the relationship does not seem to be causal.
引用
收藏
页数:22
相关论文
共 50 条