Stabilising transitions from conflict: The importance of transitional decision-making procedures

A large body of scholarship has analysed how the content of a negotiated settlement might impact the potential for conflict resolution or recurrence, focusing largely on the institutional design of transitional power-sharing formulas. To date, however, variation in procedures for joint decision-making within such institutions has not been investigated, nor has the effect that such choices might have on the stability and progress of settlement implementation. Relevant provisions tend to take one of two approaches: requiring consensus between former belligerents in a power-sharing government, or delegating responsibilities for dispute resolution to alternative and more broadly inclusive commissions. Employing original cross-national data on settlement content, the statistical results lend strong support to the central expectations put forward here - namely, that consensus rules heighten commitment problems between settlement signatories, thus increasing the risk of conflict recurrence, while delegation appears to significantly mitigate such risks, all else being equal. The findings therefore have real-world implications for the toolkit of international peace brokers.