Persistent corruption and parliamentary private-sector work experience

被引:0
|
作者
Podobnik, Boris [1 ,2 ,6 ]
Zimmermann, Klaus F. [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Medvidovic, Luka [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Zagreb Sch Econ & Management, Zagreb 10000, Croatia
[2] Fac Informat Studies, Novo Mesto 8000, Slovenia
[3] Maastricht Univ, UNU MERIT, Boschstr 24, NL-6211 AX Maastricht, Netherlands
[4] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England
[5] Global Lab Org, Essen, Germany
[6] Univ Rijeka, Fac Civil Engn, Rijeka, Croatia
关键词
Evolutionary economics; Parochialism; Network theory; Corruption; Good governance; Public and private sectors; Modeling complex dynamic economic systems; A12; A14; C10; D63; D64; D72; D73; D85; PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM; ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION; EVOLUTION; COEVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; RISK;
D O I
10.1007/s00191-024-00884-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The reasons behind the slow pace of corruption suppression within democratic systems are not well understood. We suggest that it relates to a societal inequity, precisely an insufficient parliamentary representation of the interests of private-sector workers. Our analysis of data from European Economic Area countries reveals a positive correlation between the proportion of Members of Parliament who have exclusively worked in the public sector and the level of corruption in their respective countries. Further, we find a negative correlation between a country's level of corruption representing a form of in-group cooperation and the percentage of its population in cooperatives, which serves as an indicator of universal cooperation. Finally, the emergence of breakpoints in the analysis of corruption data motivates us to propose a network model where the economy is an evolving complex system characterized by a tipping point. We argue that, particularly in more corrupt European countries, private-sector workers should be better represented by parliamentarians with private-sector work experience to successfully combat corruption and thus promote equity and good governance.
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页数:39
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