机构:
Northwestern Univ, Elect & Comp Engn, Evanston, IL 60208 USANorthwestern Univ, Elect & Comp Engn, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
Mu, Kangle
[1
]
Berry, Randall
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Northwestern Univ, Elect & Comp Engn, Evanston, IL 60208 USANorthwestern Univ, Elect & Comp Engn, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
Berry, Randall
[1
]
机构:
[1] Northwestern Univ, Elect & Comp Engn, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
来源:
2024 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS NETWORKS, DYSPAN 2024
|
2024年
基金:
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词:
wireless spectrum sharing;
game theory;
network pricing;
D O I:
10.1109/DySPAN60163.2024.10632777
中图分类号:
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号:
081202 ;
摘要:
Temporal sharing of spectrum as in the CBRS system provides wireless service providers (SPs) with spectrum that is intermittently available. This intermittency can decrease the value of the spectrum to a SP. In this paper we consider a setting where a SP can pool multiple intermittent bands of spectrum with independent availability. We find that pooling can achieve a higher spectrum efficiency in terms of the congestion incurred by users compared to using a single intermittent band (with the same total bandwidth). We show that this efficiency gain can be achieved with a relatively small pool of bands and it quickly converges to the optimal case as the number of bands increases. We also observe that pooled intermittency has a lesser impact on bids if spectrum is auctioned.
机构:
Univ North Georgia, Mike Cottrell Coll Business, Dept Econ & Finance, Dahlonega, GA 30597 USAUniv North Georgia, Mike Cottrell Coll Business, Dept Econ & Finance, Dahlonega, GA 30597 USA
Wu, Ruohan
Miranda, Mario J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USAUniv North Georgia, Mike Cottrell Coll Business, Dept Econ & Finance, Dahlonega, GA 30597 USA