On the Approach of Hegel's Jena Logic

Hegel's Jena Logic of 1804-05 is one of his least understood texts. It is evident that in this manuscript he already uses the speculative method of double negation. However, this observation leaves one question unanswered: how is it possible that this logic still stands in the forecourt of a speculative metaphysics and is supposed to be an introduction to it? By drawing attention to a letter in which Hegel sketches out the approach of his early logic in retrospect, I interpret the Jena Logic as a systematic criticism of the logic of understanding with recourse to speculative knowledge. I argue that it is this higher point of view that brings about the dialectical movement of dead logical content and that the problem about its accessibility to finite consciousness is common to all of Hegel's attempts to provide an introduction to metaphysics. Finally, I further strengthen my argument by outlining the structural comparability between the Jena Logic and Hegel's later introductions (the Phenomenology and the Vorbegriff to the Encyclopedia Logic).