The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

被引：0
|
作者：
Ali, S. Nageeb [1 ]
Mihm, Maximilian [2 ]
Siga, Lucas [3 ]
机构：
[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, State Coll, PA 16801 USA
[2] New York Univ Abu Dhabi, Div Social Sci, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
[3] Univ Essex, Dept Econ, Colchester, England
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 2025年 / 93卷 / 01期
关键词：
Voting; populism; distributive politics; polarization; fragility; adverse selection; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; POLARIZATION; UNCERTAINTY; BIAS; CONSEQUENCES; COMPETITION; MARKET;
D O I：
10.3982/ECTA22474
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of "adverse correlation" that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.
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页码：41 / 70
页数：30
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