Communication in stag hunt games: When does it really help?
被引:0
|
作者:
Agranov, Marina
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Caltech, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USACaltech, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
Agranov, Marina
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Caltech, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
Stag Hunt game;
Communication;
Efficiency;
SOCIAL DILEMMAS;
COOPERATION;
D O I:
10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111991
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper examines whether the effectiveness of cheap-talk communication in Stag-Hunt-like games is influenced by payoff asymmetry between players. We find that communication improves efficiency when both players benefit from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Otherwise, its impact is limited, regardless of whether one or both players communicate their intended actions.