What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa's 'epistemic explanations'

被引：0
|
作者：
Mace, Lilith [1 ]
Simion, Mona [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Glasgow, Cogito Epistemol Res Ctr, 69 Oafield Ave, Glasgow City G12 8LP, Scotland
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2024年
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
Doubt; Suspension; Proper function; Cognitive capacity; Knowledge-first; HISTORY; NORM;
D O I：
10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one's degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk.
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页数：16
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