North Korea's nuclear gambit: Coercion, deterrence, and the escalation-de-escalation paradox

被引:0
|
作者
Kwon, Edward [1 ]
机构
[1] Northern Kentucky Univ, Dept Polit Sci, FH561B, Highland Hts, KY 41099 USA
关键词
Kim Jong Un; North Korea; nuclear strategy; tactical nuclear weapon; US-ROK Alliance; (sic)(sic); (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic); (sic)(sic)(sic); (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic); Corea del Norte; arma nuclear t & aacute; ctica; alianza entre Estados Unidos y la Rep & uacute; blica de Corea; nuclear; SUPERIORITY; WEAPONS; PEACE;
D O I
10.1111/aspp.70006
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development and recent nuclear law permitting preemptive nuclear use have jeopardized US and ROK security. Analyzing possible channels of Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship and military provocations through international relations theories-including nuclear coercive diplomacy and the nuclear stability-instability paradox-and the "escalation to de-escalation" military strategy reveals concerning trends. Pyongyang continues to develop new WMDs and conduct military drills involving tactical nuclear weapons, enhancing Kim Jong Un's adventurous brinkmanship. In response, the United States must adopt a strong nuclear retaliation strategy, expedite its nuclear triad modernization plan, and support an effective South Korean missile defense system. A military contingency plan, and diplomatic efforts to persuade Kim to abandon WMDs are crucial. The United States must take a firm stance against nuclear threats from North Korea, ensuring a robust defense and encouraging denuclearization. This multifaceted approach will help address the security challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear program. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic) ((sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)-(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)) (sic)"(sic)(sic)-(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic). El desarrollo de armas de destrucci & oacute;n masiva por parte de Corea del Norte y la reciente ley nuclear que permite el uso preventivo de armas nucleares han puesto en peligro la seguridad de Estados Unidos y la Rep & uacute;blica de Corea. El an & aacute;lisis de los posibles canales de la pol & iacute;tica de riesgo nuclear y las provocaciones militares de Pyongyang a trav & eacute;s de las teor & iacute;as de las relaciones internacionales (incluida la diplomacia coercitiva nuclear y la paradoja de la estabilidad-inestabilidad nuclear) y la estrategia militar de "escalada a desescalada" revela tendencias preocupantes. Pyongyang sigue desarrollando nuevas armas de destrucci & oacute;n masiva y realizando ejercicios militares con armas nucleares t & aacute;cticas, lo que mejora la pol & iacute;tica de riesgo arriesgada de Kim Jong Un. En respuesta, Estados Unidos debe adoptar una fuerte estrategia de represalia nuclear, acelerar su plan de modernizaci & oacute;n de la tr & iacute;ada nuclear y apoyar un sistema de defensa antimisiles surcoreano eficaz. Un plan de contingencia militar y esfuerzos diplom & aacute;ticos para persuadir a Kim de que abandone las armas de destrucci & oacute;n masiva son cruciales. Estados Unidos debe adoptar una postura firme frente a las amenazas nucleares de Corea del Norte, garantizando una defensa s & oacute;lida y fomentando la desnuclearizaci & oacute;n. Este enfoque multifac & eacute;tico ayudar & aacute; a abordar los desaf & iacute;os de seguridad que plantea el programa nuclear de Corea del Norte.
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