Modelling, analysing and improving the revenue sharing contract in a one vendor-multi retailer supply chain based on the Stackelberg game theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Rasay H. [1 ]
Mehrjerdi Y.Z. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Industrial Engineering, Yazd University, Yazd
来源：
Mehrjerdi, Yahia Zare (Yazm2000@yahoo.com) | 2017年 / Inderscience Publishers, 29, route de Pre-Bois, Case Postale 856, CH-1215 Geneva 15, CH-1215, Switzerland卷 / 31期
关键词：
Decentralised; Revenue sharing contract; wholesale price contract; Stackelberg game; Supply chain; Vendor managed inventory; VMI;
D O I：
10.1504/IJMTM.2017.088449
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory in this system. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modelling and analysing of this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is presented that can explain the performance of the system under revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract and centralised structure. Based upon this model, we numerically analysed the performance of the revenue sharing contract in the considered supply chain. Using numerical analysis, the weakness point of revenue sharing contract in supply chain coordination is investigated and a practical solution for improving the performance of this contract is introduced. Copyright © 2017 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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页码：402 / 423
页数：21
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