Study on the mechanism setting of PM2.5 emission reduction index - A case study on haze control of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei

被引：0

作者：

Zhou Z. ^{[1
]}

Xing Y. ^{[1
]}

Sun H. ^{[2
]}

Yu X. ^{[3
]}

Tan Z. ^{[1
]}

Shao Q. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing

[2] Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing

[3] Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing

[4] Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing

来源：

Yu, Xiaohui | 2018年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 38期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Haze control strategy; Mechanism design; Non-cooperative game; PM[!sub]2.5[!/sub] emission reduction index;

D O I：

10.12011/1000-6788(2018)03-0710-09

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper studied the mechanism of the PM2.5 emission reduction index of the central government from the perspective of non-cooperative game. First, according to the contribution matrix of haze transmission across regions, the PM2.5 reduction capacity was calculated. Later, the PM2.5 governance costs in various regions was calculated. Then, the non-cooperative haze governance strategy in different regions under different haze indicators was studied. Finally, according to the abatement capacity of all regions and the haze control strategy, how the central government determines PM2.5 emission reduction targets to maximize the emission reduction of PM2.5 in all regions was studied. Based on 2015, this paper took the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as an example to explore the setting of PM2.5 emission reduction index in 2020 and 2030 so as to promote the removal of PM2.5 in all regions under the non-cooperative game. © 2018, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.

引用

页码：710 / 718

页数：8

共 29 条

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