Game theory analysis of protection of tourist consumers’ rights and interests at lawsuit angle

On the basis of fundamental theories of law and economics, with the help of tools of game theory, this paper has taken a lawsuit angle and studied on torts of tourist companies and suits for protection of tourist consumers’ rights and interests. Results show that under mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium, the costs of a suit for protection of tourist consumers’ rights and interests are positively correlated with the chance of infringement of tourist companies, while negatively correlated with the chance for tourist consumers to file a suit for protection. In addition, the economic compensations provided by tourist companies losing a suit are negatively correlated with both the chance of infringement of tourist companies and the chance for tourist consumers to file a suit for protection, and there is an optimum amount of compensations making the chance of infringement of tourist companies equals to the chance for tourist consumers to file a suit for protection. The results are significant to practical applications on protection of tourist consumers’ rights and interests at lawsuit angle. © 2017 Taru Publications.