Multi-agent Energy-carbon Sharing Mechanism for Parks Based on Stackelberg Game

Under the background of carbon emission reduction in the power system, the main approach is to incentivize clean transformation of power generation enterprises on the supply side to reduce carbon emissions. However, it should be noted that a considerable amount of carbon emissions cannot be reduced temporarily. Exploring the carbon reduction potential of end-users on the distribution network side is an effective means to increase the upper limit of carbon reduction in the power system. However, at present, low-carbon strategies for electricity consumption terminals are often achieved through economic strategies such as carbon emission cost transmission or price guidance, which is called “passive carbon reduction”. How to guide the carbon cost of power generation and incentivize users to reduce emissions deeply is a key issue in improving the total carbon reduction upper limit of the power system. Based on the perspective of electricity-carbon coupling, this paper proposes a new business model of park peer-to-peer (P2P) energy-carbon sharing, constructs a utility model considering carbon trading for park operators and users, and builds a P2P energy-carbon sharing mechanism that integrates information flow, energy flow and carbon flow. Then, based on Stackelberg game framework, an optimal energy-carbon pricing model is designed to optimize and guide park users’ energy and carbon sharing. Finally, through case studies, the effectiveness of this method is demonstrated. The results show that the mechanism can optimize energy and carbon pricing in parks, incentivize users to participate in sharing actively, increase park revenue, and further reduce park carbon emissions while improving the new energy consumption rate of multi-energy parks. ©2024 Chin.Soc.for Elec.Eng.