I argue that sich vorstellen ('imagine') in German, similar to English imagine, has a use as a fiction verb and a use as a verb of thinking. I follow Vendler (Rev M & eacute;taphys Morale 84(2):161-173, 1979) in assuming that the fiction verbs like vorstellen can be used to report acts of subjective imagination (imagined inner experiences) and acts of objective imagination (imagined outer experiences). For sich vorstellen as a verb of thinking we have to distinguish between a use on which it introduces an activity and takes interrogative complements and DPs on a concealed question interpretation as arguments and a use on which it introduces an attitudinal state that can be characterized as betting on the truth of a proposition in a given subject matter. Given the differences in grammar and interpretation I argue that we have to distinguish four lexical entries for German sich vorstellen: imagine(EXP-SBJ), imagine(EXP-OBJ), imagine(PROP-ACT), imagine(PROP-STATE). Having laid out all the necessary distinctions to account for the data, I discuss the prospects of reducing the number of lexical entries. I propose that imagine(EXP-SBJ) and imagine(EXP-OBJ) could be reduced to imagine(PROP-ACT) if we assume that all reports of experiential imagining can be reduced to reports of propositional imagining that combine the predicate imagine(PROP-ACT) with a question of the kind 'what would it be like?', following an idea in D'Ambrosio and Stoljar (Synthese 199:12923-12944, 2021). Under this assumption only two lexical entries are needed: an entry for imagine(PROP-ACT), a rogative predicate that introduces activities, and imaginePROP-STATE an attitude predicate that takes propositions as arguments and introduces an attitudinal state. The overall result is that the grammar and interpretation of the fiction verb sich vorstellen is much closer to verbs of thinking than one might imagine.
