Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

被引：26
|
作者：
Eraslan, Hulya [1 ]
Evdokimov, Kirill S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77251 USA
来源：
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 11, 2019 | 2019年 / 11卷
关键词：
legislative bargaining; multilateral bargaining; weighted voting; coalitional bargaining; spatial bargaining; STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS; SOPHISTICATED VOTING OUTCOMES; MAJORITY-RULE; GOVERNMENT FORMATION; COALITION-FORMATION; STOCHASTIC-MODEL; DECISION-MAKING; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; PROPORTIONAL PAYOFFS; PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I：
10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.
引用
收藏
页码：443 / 472
页数：30
相关论文
共 50 条
12345