Tax competition effects of a minimum tax rate: Empirical evidence from German municipalities

被引:0
|
作者
Buettner, Thiess [1 ,2 ]
Poehnlein, Maximilian [1 ]
机构
[1] FAU, Erlangen, Germany
[2] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Tax competition; Minimum tax; Local business tax; Tax havens; YARDSTICK COMPETITION; TAXATION; COORDINATION; GOVERNMENTS; CHOICES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105148
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper explores the effects of a federal law that obligates previously unregulated municipalities in Germany to set a minimum tax rate on firms' taxable profits. In particular, we examine the tax -policy response of municipalities that compete locally with "tax -haven municipalities", i.e. municipalities that originally have set lower and, in some cases, even zero tax rates. The analysis distinguishes treated and not -treated municipalities based on their distance to a tax -haven. Our results show that the majority of municipalities do not change their tax policy. Apart from the tax -havens, only high -tax municipalities show a response - they reduce the business tax rate without experiencing a decline in tax revenues.
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页数:27
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