The Influence of Opportunism on the Cooperation Modes of Carbon Emission Reduction

被引:0
|
作者
Li, Jinxi [1 ]
Liu, Jing [2 ]
Yi, Yuyin [3 ]
Chen, Youxie [4 ]
机构
[1] Suzhou City Univ, Sch Digital Econ & Management, Suzhou 215104, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China
[3] Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China
[4] Jinan Univ, Presidents Off & Off CPC JNU Comm, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China
关键词
Carbon tax; consumer environmental awareness; CER cooperation; opportunism; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL-RESEARCH; DEVELOPMENT SPILLOVERS; SUPPLY CHAINS; BEHAVIOR; TAX; MECHANISM; DECISIONS; STRATEGY; PREFERENCES;
D O I
10.1007/s11518-024-5614-z
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Investment and technology cooperation has become prevalent among manufacturers for reducing carbon emission. However, the success and sustainability of such cooperation can be restrained by firm opportunism. This study investigates the impact of three different cooperation modes (CER investment cooperation, information sharing cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation) on manufacturers' efforts for carbon emission reduction (CER). We also analyze how opportunism in key resources input affects the CER cooperation, and explore the influence of carbon tax and consumer environmental awareness (CEA) on opportunistic motivation. Our results show that 1) Manufacturers engaged in cooperation will increase their profits, but may not necessarily lessen carbon emission, which is related to the intensity of market competition. 2) The optimal mode for manufacturers is comprehensive cooperation, followed by information sharing cooperation, and then is CER investment cooperation. 3) Opportunism is not necessarily detrimental to CER. 4) In the comprehensive cooperation mode, the impact of opportunism to the co-operative manufacturer is hierarchical, and whether the cooperation continues depends on the intensity of market competition. 5) CEA will encourage the opportunism, while the effect of carbon tax on opportunistic motivation is related to the market size.
引用
收藏
页码:736 / 758
页数:23
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