Tullock contest with reference-dependent preferences

被引:0
|
作者
Fallucchi, Francesco [1 ]
Trevisan, Francesco [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy
[2] CaFoscari Univ Venice, Dept Econ, Cannaregio 873, I-30121 Venice, Italy
关键词
asymmetry; contest; desire to win; loss aversion; rent-seeking; AVERSION;
D O I
10.1111/ecin.13251
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenously formed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversion on players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
引用
收藏
页码:1618 / 1628
页数:11
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