Tullock contest with reference-dependent preferences

被引：0
|
作者：
Fallucchi, Francesco [1 ]
Trevisan, Francesco [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy
[2] CaFoscari Univ Venice, Dept Econ, Cannaregio 873, I-30121 Venice, Italy
来源：
ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2024年 / 62卷 / 04期
关键词：
asymmetry; contest; desire to win; loss aversion; rent-seeking; AVERSION;
D O I：
10.1111/ecin.13251
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenously formed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversion on players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
引用
收藏
页码：1618 / 1628
页数：11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] On the theory of reference-dependent preferences
    Munro, A
    Sugden, R
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2003, 50 (04) : 407 - 428
  • [2] A model of reference-dependent preferences
    Koszegi, Botond
    Rabin, Matthew
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 121 (04): : 1133 - 1165
  • [3] Reference-dependent preferences and probability judgments
    Ishii, Takaharu
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS, 2023, 86
  • [4] Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences
    Gallice, Andrea
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2019, 48 (01) : 311 - 336
  • [5] A test of the theory of reference-dependent preferences
    Bateman, I
    Munro, A
    Rhodes, B
    Starmer, C
    Sugden, R
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 112 (02): : 479 - 505
  • [6] Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences
    Daido, Kohei
    Murooka, Takeshi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 2016, 25 (04) : 958 - 989
  • [7] Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent Preferences
    Ingersoll, Jonathan E., Jr.
    Jin, Lawrence J.
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2013, 26 (03): : 723 - 767
  • [8] Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences
    Kyle Hyndman
    [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2011, 40 : 527 - 549
  • [9] Settlement Negotiations with Reference-Dependent Preferences
    Roessler, Christoph
    Friehe, Tim
    [J]. AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW, 2022, 24 (01) : 171 - 202
  • [10] Reference-Dependent Preferences and Insurance Demand
    Fan Chen
    Chen Bingzheng
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2017 CHINA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT, 2017, : 909 - 927
12345