Credibility of central banks in monetary economies

被引：0

作者：

Iwasaki, Kohei ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kyoto Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Yoshida honmachi,Sakyo ku, Kyoto 6068501, Japan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2024年 / 243卷

关键词：

Money; Central bank digital currency; Self-fulfilling expectations; Privacy; COORDINATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111927

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a model of money to study interventions by a central bank that can monitor the money holdings of agents. I show that an off-the-equilibrium intervention enhances the use of money and stabilizes its values.

引用

页数：3

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