This study investigates the localistic behavior of legislators elected under open-list proportional representation (OLPR), focusing on the impacts of district magnitude, intra-party competition, electorate size, and the presence of a national tier. We examine the Ecuadorian case, where institutional reformers implemented a national tier to offset the parochial tendencies of lower-tier provincial legislators yet retained OLPR for both tiers. Our study, which analyzes a 12-year dataset of congressional speeches, challenges the expectation that national-tier members are less localistic than their provincial counterparts and shows that electoral incentives drive legislators' geographical focus. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find no evidence that increased intra-party competition is associated with more localistic behavior. However, there is consistent support for the hypothesis that smaller electoral constituencies amplify localistic behavior.
机构:
IE Univ Campus Madrid, IE Sch Global & Publ Affairs, Calle Maria de Molina 6, Madrid 28006, SpainIE Univ Campus Madrid, IE Sch Global & Publ Affairs, Calle Maria de Molina 6, Madrid 28006, Spain
机构:
Abo Akad Univ, Social Sci Res Inst, Fac Social Sci Business & Econ, Turku, FinlandTampere Univ, Fac Management & Business, Kanslerinrinne 1, Tampere 33014, Finland