Device-Side Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme Based on Chameleon Hashing for Industrial Internet of Things

Several authentication and key agreement (AKA) schemes have been proposed to ensure secure communication in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). However, most of these schemes face two primary problems. First, they cannot resist various attacks, such as impersonation and device capture attacks. Second, these schemes overlook the resource-constrained IIoT devices, failing to guarantee lightweight overhead for device operations. Therefore, we propose a novel and efficient AKA scheme. Utilizing the chameleon hash function and physical unclonable function, the proposed scheme implements a lightweight overhead for both authentication parties while maintaining the overhead of the gateway within a reasonable range. Furthermore, we implement device anonymity based on lightweight operations such as hash and XOR. In addition, we perform a rigorous security analysis using the widely accepted Real-Or-Random model, BAN logic, and Proverif tool. Finally, through heuristic analysis and experiments, we substantiate that our scheme surpasses the compared schemes in terms of both security attributes and system overhead.