Cooperative game theory;
Cost allocation;
Happy nucleolus;
Set covering;
GAMES;
CORE;
AXIOMATIZATION;
D O I:
10.1016/j.orl.2024.107158
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号:
070105 ;
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
We consider cost allocation for set covering problems. We allocate as much cost to the elements (players) as possible without violating the group rationality condition, and so that the excess vector is lexicographically maximized. This happy nucleolus has several nice properties. In particular, we show that it can be computed considering a small subset of "simple" coalitions only. While computing the nucleolus for set covering is NP-hard, our results imply that the happy nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time. (c) 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by-nc -nd /4 .0/).
机构:
V. M. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, KyivV. M. Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv